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Economists have long known that individual wages depend on a combination of employee 
and employer characteristics, as well as the interaction of the two.  Although it is important to 
understand how employee and employer characteristics are related to wages, little is known 
about the magnitude and relation of these wage effects.  This is primarily due to the lack of 
microdata which links individuals to the establishments where they work, but also due to 
technical difficulties associated with separating out employee and employer effects.  This 
paper uses data from the Occupational Employment Statistics program at the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics that permit both of these issues to be addressed.  Our results show that employer 
effects contribute substantially to earnings differences across individuals.  We also find that 
establishments that pay well for one occupation also pay well for others.  This paper 
contributes to the growing literature that analyzes firms￿ compensation policies, and 
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Economists have long known that individual wages depend on a combination of 
employee and employer characteristics, as well as the interaction of the two.  Although it is 
important to understand how employee and employer characteristics are related to wages, 
little is known about the magnitude and relation of these wage effects.  This is primarily due 
to the lack of microdata which links individuals to the establishments where they work, but 
also due to technical difficulties associated with separating out employee and employer 
effects.  In this paper, we use microdata from the Occupational Employment Statistics 
program at the Bureau of Labor Statistics that permit both of these issues to be addressed.  
These data contain information from more than half a million establishments, in all sectors of 
the economy, with wages reported for over 34 million individuals in more than 800 
occupations.  This paper contributes to the growing literature that analyzes the impact of 
firms￿ compensation policies, and specifically the topic of employer effects on wages. 
  The main contribution of this paper is the empirical estimates of how wages are 
influenced by the establishment at which the individual works.  Our decomposition of wages 
into employee and employer effects is based on similar work by Groshen (1991b), which uses 
OLS regressions to partition the sum of squares of wages into worker and establishment 
components.  Our results show that employer effects contribute substantially to earnings 
differences -- the results from our basic model show that controlling for detailed occupation, 
establishment dummies account for over one-fifth of wage variation.  We modify Groshen￿s 
decomposition and show that these large employer effects can be only partially explained by 
observable characteristics such as the location, size, age, and industry of the establishment. 
  In order to examine the breadth of the establishment wage differential across 
occupations, we calculate the correlations of occupational wages within establishments.  Our 
results are striking -- we find that establishments that pay well for one occupation also pay 
well for others.  Even after controlling for observable establishment characteristics, we find 
positive wage correlations within establishments for occupations that are closely related, as 
well as for occupations that one would not expect to be closely related in the production 
process.  This empirical finding has interesting implications for theories that attempt to 




II.  Background and Literature Review 
 
IIa) Empirical Estimates of Establishment Wage Differentials 
  Establishment wage differentials (EWDs) are defined as the wage premium, 
controlling for occupation and individual characteristics, that is common to all individuals in 
an establishment.  While economists have known about EWDs since the studies of employer 
wage policies in the 1940s and 1950s -- see the literature review in Segal (1986) -- it is only 
recently with the advent of large linked employer-employee micro-databases that systematic 
statistical analyses of establishment wage differentials have been conducted.  The empirical 
strategy used by almost all of these recent studies has been to define EWDs as the percentage 
of individual wage variation accounted for by adding establishment indicators to a regression 
that already includes controls for occupation and worker characteristics. 
  Groshen (1991b) is the seminal article in this modern literature.  Using data for six 
manufacturing industries from the Bureau of Labor Statistics￿ Industry Wage Surveys, 
Groshen decomposed earnings variation into occupational and establishment differentials as 
well as the interaction between the two.  She found that establishments contribute 
substantially to earnings differences -- when controlling for occupation, establishment wage 
differentials account for a sizeable amount of individual wage variation, ranging from 12 
percent in the cotton and man-made textiles industry to 58 percent in the industrial chemicals 
industry. 
  Groshen￿s methodology and basic findings have been replicated with other data in 
recent studies.  Using data from 241 establishments responding to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics￿ White Collar Pay Survey, and controlling for individual worker characteristics, 
Bronars and Famulari (1997) find that 18 percent of individual wage variation is due to 
establishment wage differentials.  Extending this work to provide a comparison of the United 
States and Denmark, Bronars, Bingley, Famulari, and Westergard-Nielsen (1999) report that 
20 percent of variation in Danish while collar pay and 36 percent of variation in Danish blue 
collar pay is attributable to establishment wage differentials.  Using data on 50,000 
managerial positions in 39 companies, and controlling for job characteristics and job 
requirements (as measured by Hay points), O’Shaughnessy, Levine, and Cappelli (2000) find  
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that 8 to 9 percent of individual wage variation is due to firm wage differentials.  Finally, a 
study of the Brazilian and Chilean labor markets, Mizala and Romaguera (1998) report that 7 
to 9 percent of Brazilian wage variation and 6 to 18 percent of Chilean wage variation can be 
attributed to firm wage differentials. 
  The studies just cited use cross-sectional data with multiple individuals per 
establishment (or firm), and report estimates of EWDs controlling for observed heterogeneity 
across individuals.  It is natural to wonder whether these estimated EWDs might be measuring 
differences in average worker skill across establishments, which would result from a sorting 
of individuals into establishments based on characteristics unobserved by the econometrician.  
Evaluating this hypothesis requires panel data with multiple observations per individual and 
multiple individuals per establishment.  Abowd, Kramarz, and their coauthors show that firm 
wage differentials in France account for 25 percent of wage variation conditional on observed 
worker characteristics, and account for 19 percent of wage variation conditional on both 
observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity.
1  These results demonstrates that using 
longitudinal microdata to account for unobserved heterogeneity diminishes but does not 
remove the estimated employer effect on wages. 
 
IIb) Theoretical Explanations for Establishment Wage Differentials 
  Groshen (1991a) is the classic reference regarding theoretical explanations for 
establishment wage differentials.  She proposes and evaluates five explanations for why 
individual wages vary among employers.  These explanations for establishment wage 
differentials can also be found in the somewhat older and more well established industry wage 
differentials literature.
2 
                                                         
1  The statistics presented in this paragraph are from personal communications with John Abowd.  He has 
graciously provided us with the R-squareds from exact solutions, instead of the R-squareds that are based upon 
approximations and are reported in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).  For the record, there is nothing 
wrong with the approximations.  Differences between the approximations and the exact solutions lies in the fact 
that insufficient computing capacity for analysis of the French data did not allow for the inclusion of enough 
terms in the approximation to get the approximate solution close to the full least squares solution.  The paper by 
Abowd, Finer, and Kramarz (1999) did all the calculations using the same approximations with data from the 
State of Washington, without computer constraints, and the R-squareds based on the approximations are fine.  
See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for further details. 
2  Key references that have influenced the industry wage differentials literature are Dickens and Katz (1987), 
Katz and Summers (1989), Krueger and Summers (1988), and Murphy and Topel (1987).  
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     The first explanation is that of labor quality, where employers systematically sort workers 
by ability as predicted by team production models.  Groshen offers two key reasons for why 
the sorting model is not the sole source of establishment wage differentials.  First, EWDs are 
estimated conditional on controls for occupation, and Groshen argues that detailed 
occupational information proxies quite well for standard human capital variables.  Similarly, 
industry wage differentials are estimated conditional on human capital controls, and these 
differentials still exist after controlling for unobserved individual ability in a longitudinal 
analysis.  Second, it is difficult to reconcile the sorting explanation with the finding that 
establishment and industry wage differentials apply to all occupations. 
  A second explanation for the existence of establishment wage differentials is that of 
compensating differentials.  Compensating differentials are defined as a wage premium paid 
to workers to compensate them for undesirable working conditions.  This explanation is 
problematic since the risk of injury is occupation specific, rather than applying to all workers 
in the establishment.  Furthermore, the industry wage differentials literature has empirically 
examined and rejected the hypothesis of compensating differentials as an explanation for the 
wage differentials. 
  A third explanation for the existence of establishment wage differentials is that costly 
information may generate random variation in wages across employers.  For example, 
employers may profit from individuals who find it costly to search for alternative wage offers, 
or employers who hire infrequently may not have adjusted their pay structure since their last 
hiring cycle.  Groshen (1991a) rejects this explanation based on evidence that employer wage 
differentials are persistent. 
  The fourth explanation proposed by Groshen (1991a) for the existence of 
establishment wage differentials is efficiency wages.  Efficiency wage theories, particularly 
those that emphasize morale, loyalty, and teamwork, can explain why workers in all 
occupations receive the establishment wage premium.  With efficiency wages, differences 
across establishments resulting from a variety of factors such as monitoring costs, turnover 
costs, or managerial tastes generates the heterogeneity necessary to observe establishment 
specific pay policies.  Unfortunately, there is little, if any, direct empirical evidence on the 
relationship between efficiency wages and establishment wage differentials.  
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  A fifth explanation is a model where wage variation across employers results from 
workers bargaining over rents, or employers sharing profits with employees for other reasons.  
These models can generate the result that the establishment wage premium covers all 
occupations.  However, the bargaining models are difficult to evaluate, especially their 
applicability outside the union sector.  Groshen finds some support for rent sharing models, 
citing the empirical literature which tends to show a positive relationship between an 
individual’s wage and the employer’s or the industry’s profits.
3 
  The literature on employer-size wage differentials also evaluates similar explanations 
regarding why the wages of individuals are associated with the establishment where they 
work (see Oi and Idson, 1999, for a recent survey).  Briefly, the evidence from this literature 
suggests that theories based on compensating differentials, union avoidance, monitoring, and 
rent sharing accruing from product market power contribute little to explaining the employer-
size wage differential.  Sorting is a more likely possibility: Brown and Medoff (1989) find 
that labor quality variables reduce the simple size coefficients by roughly one-half, and 
controlling for unobserved labor quality in a longitudinal fixed effects regression reduces the 
size coefficients by a further five to forty-five percent.  Even so, there remains a significant 
size effect after controlling for both observed and unobserved labor quality.  Alb￿k, Arai, 
Asplund, Barth, and Madsen (1998) also find that the sorting of workers on unobserved 
characteristics does not explain the estimated size effect.  Troske (1999) uses linked 
employer-employee microdata that allows him to evaluate explanations that can not be 
analyzed using most databases.  He finds that more skilled workers tend to work together, as 
predicted by team production models, and this matching reduces the employer-size wage 
premium by approximately 20 percent.  However, Troske concludes that a large and 
significant employer-size wage premium still exists and remains unexplained. 
  A recent and comprehensive analysis of employer effects on wages is provided by 
Abowd and Kramarz (1999).  Building on previous work in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(1999) and Abowd, Finer, and Kramarz (1999), this study decomposes estimates of a simply 
estimated employer differential into components that are due to unobserved individual 
                                                         
3  Hildreth and Oswald (1997) is a recent reference documenting the rent sharing hypothesis.  However, Margolis 
and Salvanes (2000) present evidence that suggests that a sizable portion of the positive correlation between firm 
profits and worker earnings is due to interactions between the unobservable characteristics of the firm￿s 
workforce and the bargaining power of workers at different stages of the business cycle.  
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heterogeneity and unobserved firm heterogeneity.  Using data for both France and the United 
States, Abowd and Kramarz find that 45 to 50 percent of the ￿raw￿ industry wage differential 
is due to unobserved firm heterogeneity, and 71 to 76 percent of the ￿raw￿ firm size wage 
differential is due to unobserved firm heterogeneity.  While the sources of the unobserved 
firm heterogeneity remain unknown, these empirical estimates document that employer 
effects on wages exist.  This type of analysis based on linked employer-employee microdata is 
bringing the topic of employer effects on wages back to the forefront of the theoretical and the 
empirical literature. 
 
III.  The Wage Decomposition Methodology 
 
  Our empirical analysis is based on the methodology used by Groshen (1991b).  We 
have a measure of log wages Wiej for individual "i" in establishment "e" in occupation "j."  
We want to decompose the variation in wages into components attributable to occupational 
differentials, establishment differentials, and differences across individuals.  Following 
Groshen, we estimate the following four regressions: 
 
  (Occ)       Wiej = µ + OCCjα  + ε iej, 
 
  (Est)       Wiej = µ + ESTeβ  + ε iej, 
 
  (Main)      Wiej = µ + OCCjα  + ESTeβ  + ε iej, 
 
  (Cell)       Wiej = µ + OCCjα  + ESTeβ  + (OCCj*ESTe)γ  + ε iej. 
 
In these regressions, OCCj is a vector of dummy variables indicating the occupation, ESTe is a 
vector of dummy variables indicating the establishment, and (OCCj*ESTe) is a vector of 
dummy variables indicating an occupational-establishment job cell. 
  This wage decomposition partitions the sum of squares of wages into its various 
components.  As Groshen (1991b) mentions, this statistical technique avoids imposing 
structure on unbalanced data.  The OES microdata are unbalanced, with a different number of 
workers across occupations, and a different number of occupations across establishments.  
The R-squareds from each of the four regressions are the key to the decomposition (we will  
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  As seen from the first three regressions above, log wages are regressed on vectors of 
occupation and establishment indicators separately, and then on both sets of indicators 
together (the main effects model).  The marginal contribution of establishment indicators to 
the main effects model, relative to the regression with just occupation indicators, measures the 










Est), and measures the portion of wage variation associated 
unambiguously with the occupation indicators. 
  The explanatory power of occupation and establishment together in the main effects 
model does not necessarily equal the sum of the marginal contributions to the main effects 
model from the establishment indicators and from the occupation indicators.  This difference, 






Main), is referred to as the "joint" explanatory power of 
occupation and establishment.  This joint contribution is non-zero if there is any sorting of 
occupations across establishments.  Positive sorting occurs if high wage occupations are 







negative sorting occurs if high wage occupations are concentrated in establishments with 






Main).  The existing literature -- Groshen (1991b) and 
Groshen and Levine (1998) -- has found positive sorting between occupational wage 
differentials and establishment wage differentials. 
  In the fourth regression above, the job cell interactions measure the wage premium 
paid to a particular occupation in a particular establishment above or below the wage 
premium predicted by the occupational and the establishment differentials.  The relative 




Main).  The 
explanatory power of job cells capture what Groshen and Levine (1998) refer to as the 
"internal (wage) structure effect."  In a wage regression, the job cells can reflect many factors.  
For example, the initial phases of an establishment’s production process may resemble the 
average in the industry, but the finishing process may require workers of higher than average 
ability.  Another example may be that the wage profile in the establishment is tilted, either 
because of on-the-job training given to entry-level workers, or as a result of deferring wages  
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in order to offer workers incentives not to shirk.  The job cell effects could also reflect 
differences in occupational tenure across establishments. 
  The final contribution to wages is the individual contribution.  This is measured as  
(1 - R
2
Cell), and is the portion of the total sum of squares of wages that can not be explained by 
occupation and establishment indicators.  This individual contribution is undoubtedly due to 
unobserved wage effects from gender, education, tenure, or other individual attributes that are 
not captured by the interactions of the occupation and establishment indicators. 
  In summary, we estimate four regressions of log wages on various combinations of 
occupation and establishment dummy variables, and we focus on the R-squareds from these 
four regressions.  Simple comparisons of these R-squareds provide information on 
occupational and establishment wage differentials, the degree of occupational sorting across 
establishments, the importance of employer specific wage structures, and the importance of 
unobserved individual heterogeneity (controlling for occupation and establishment). 
 
IV.  The Data 
 
  We use microdata from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program at the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The OES is an annual mail survey measuring occupational 
employment and wages by geographic area and by industry.  Approximately 400,000 
establishments are surveyed each year.  The OES survey covers all full-time and part-time 
wage and salary workers in nonfarm industries.  The survey does not cover the self-employed, 
owners and partners in unincorporated firms, household workers, or unpaid family workers.  
In 1996 the OES program began collecting wage data along with occupational employment 
data in every State.  The survey is designed as a three-year sample, with one-third of both the 
certainty and non-certainty strata sampled each year. 
  We use the 1996 and 1997 microdata in our analysis.  Our sample has 573,586 
establishments with no imputations of wage or employment data.
4  These establishments 
                                                         
4  The response rate for the OES survey is 78 percent (thus we have survey responses from roughly 624,000 of 
the 800,000 sampled establishments).  The remaining sample reduction is to exclude the establishments that 
report employment or wage data for some but not all occupations.  For example, if the human resources clerk 
filling out the survey does not have wage data for upper management, the clerk may report all employment data 
but not all wage data.  
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cover 34,453,430 workers categorized by occupation and wage interval.  We also have 
information on the location, industry, size, and age of each establishment. 
  The OES survey asks establishments to fill out the elements of a matrix, where 
occupations are listed on the rows and various wage ranges are listed in the columns.  For 
each occupation, respondents are asked to report the number of employees paid within 
specific wage intervals.  An example of the OES survey form, with many of the occupations 
omitted for presentation purposes, is given in Figure 1.  Separate OES survey forms are 
designed for each industry group, and list the occupations that are typical in the industry.  
Survey forms contain between 50 and 225 OES occupations, depending on the industry 
classification and size class of the sampled establishments.  If an occupation is not listed on a 
survey form, the respondent is asked to include the information on a supplemental page.  To 
reduce paperwork and respondent burden, no survey form contains every OES occupation. 
  The occupational data in the 1996 and 1997 OES survey are based on the 1980 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) System.  Occupations are classified based upon 
work performed, skills, education, training, and credentials.  There are 824 detailed 
occupations in our OES microdata.  In some of our analysis, we aggregate these 824 detailed 
(five-digit) occupational codes into seven major (one-digit) occupations: Management, 
Professional, Sales, Clerical, Services, Agricultural, and Production. 
  As seen in Figure 1, the wage information provided by establishments in the OES 
survey is recorded in intervals for either hourly or annual rates of pay.  The actual values we 
use for these intervals are the mean wage of all workers within the interval as computed from 
the National Compensation Survey for that year.
5  In the following section and in the 
appendix of this paper, we discuss the econometrics and the empirical consequences of wage 
data reported as interval means.  All of the wages used in our analysis are measured, in real 
terms, as the natural logarithm of hourly rates of pay.
6 
                                                         
5  The interval mean for the bottom interval may vary for states with a minimum wage above the federal 
minimum.  The interval mean for the top interval is set in nominal terms at $60.01.  This upper wage interval 
contains 0.7% of the individuals in our sample (244,727 / 34,453,430).  We have found that the results from our 
wage decomposition are not sensitive to the point estimate used for this upper interval: the establishment effects 
we report in Table 1 are 20.86% using the point estimate of $60.01, and would be 20.78% using a point estimate 
of $70.01 and 20.69% using a point estimate of $80.01. 
6  Given that the wage data can be reported as either annual or hourly, there is a concern that the establishment 
wage differentials could reflect hours differences across establishments.  The example of banking comes to 
mind: a bank with ￿bankers￿ hours￿ may have tellers working six hours per day, whereas a full service bank may 
have tellers working eight hours per day.  Our estimated EWDs could be affected if earnings for occupations  
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  The obvious strengths of the OES microdata for economic analysis are the sample size 
and the level of occupational detail.  Specifically, there are more than half a million 
establishments in our sample, covering over 34 million individuals in more than 800 
occupations.  As such, the OES data can be viewed as a proxy for matched employer-
employee microdata.  The second strength of the OES is the employer-reported occupational 
data.  Although the dataset contains no information regarding the worker￿s demographic 
characteristics (such as age, race, or gender) or other labor market characteristics (such as 
tenure, experience, or training), we note that the detailed occupational information should 
proxy for a worker￿s skills.  We will return to this latter point in the discussion of our 
empirical estimates. 
 
V.  Empirical Wage Decompositions 
 
Va) Basic Results 
  We present the results of our wage decomposition in Table 1.  In the first column, we 
report estimates using the seven one-digit occupation measures.  In the second column, we 
report estimates using the 824 five-digit occupation measures.  The first four rows report the 
R-squareds from the regressions described earlier.
7  The bottom five rows report the various 
contributions of occupation and establishment to wage variation. 
  The R-squareds in the fourth row of Table 1 demonstrate that knowing an individual￿s 
occupation and workplace go a very long way to explaining individual wage variation.  More 
than 72 percent of wage variation is explained by knowing the individual’s one-digit 
occupation and establishment, and almost 88 percent of wage variation is explained by 
knowing the individual’s five-digit occupation and establishment.  This implies that 
approximately 12 percent of wage variation is left to unobserved individual heterogeneity 
(although we acknowledge that this is probably an underestimate because of our use of 
interval data). 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
with hours variation across establishments are reported on an annual basis.  This potential bias should be 
mitigated, however, by the fact that the OES survey respondents are instructed to classify part time workers 
according to an hourly rate. 
7  These regressions are estimated from our microdata covering 34 million individuals.  The R-squareds from a 
regression using 34 million individuals are identical to the R-squareds from a regression using 7,778,248 ￿cells￿ 
weighted by employment, where a ￿cell￿ is a wage interval within an establishment-occupation job cell.  
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  The importance of the information contained in the detailed occupational categories 
becomes clear from an analysis of the first row in Table 1.  In the first column, the seven one-
digit occupation indicators explain more than 28 percent of wage variation.  In the second 
column, the 824 five-digit occupation indicators explain more than 54 percent of wage 
variation.  This empirically confirms our belief that the OES occupational data provide 
meaningful information about the work performed in the job, as well as the skills, education, 
training, and credentials of the persons performing the work. 
  The R-squareds in the second row illustrate that establishment indicators alone explain 
about half of the wage variation.  This regression is of interest other than its intermediary role 
in our wage decomposition.  Kremer and Maskin (1996) have developed an index which 
captures the degree to which workers with similar wages are grouped across establishments.  
The Kremer and Maskin segregation index is nothing more than the R-squared from a 
regression of individual wages on a vector of establishment dummies.  Our estimate of .4955 
is roughly comparable to other estimates from the United States.
8 
  In the bottom half of Table 1, we report the decomposition of wage variation into its 
component parts.  Looking at the second column, we find that 26 percent of wage variation is 
associated unambiguously with occupation, and 21 percent of wage variation is associated 
unambiguously with information on the worker’s establishment.  An important part of the 
story is the sorting between occupations and establishments -- we find that this joint 
contribution accounts for 29 percent of wage variation.  And the final portion of the explained 
wage variation is the job cell contribution, which accounts for just over 12 percent of wage 
variation.  The residual 12 percent of wage variation in the OES data is due to unobserved 
variation across individuals within a job cell. 
                                                         
8  Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) report that 51 to 58 percent of the total variance in wages is accounted for by 
the dispersion in mean wages across plants.  One can manipulate Groshen’s (1991b) estimates in her Table 2 and 
conclude that the R-squareds from regressions of log wages on establishment dummies range from .17 to .75, 
with a simple mean across the six industries of .49.  Bronars and Famulari (1997) report an R-squared of .45.  
The results in Lane, Lerman, and Stevens (1998) suggest that the proportion of wage variance explained by 
between firm variation is roughly .45.  Outside the United States, Kramarz, Lolliver, and PelØ (1996) report a 
wage-based segregation measure for France of .38 in 1986 and .48 in 1992, and Bronars, Bingley, Famulari, and 




  It is interesting to compare the results of our wage decomposition with the results 
reported by Groshen (1991b).
9  If we compute the simple average across the six industries 
reported by Groshen, her results fall in between the results we report in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 1.  For example, Groshen’s estimates imply that occupation indicators account for a 
mean of 20 percent of wage variation, and establishment indicators account for a mean of 32 
percent of wage variation.  Our estimates of the occupation effect range from 15 to 26 
percent, and our estimates of the establishment effect range from 21 to 36 percent.  Our 
estimates of the joint sorting effect (14 to 29 percent), the job cell effect (8 to 12 percent), and 
the individual effect (12 to 27 percent) are also comparable to the means of the estimates 
reported by Groshen (17 percent, 10 percent, and 22 percent, respectively). 
  The estimates in Table 1 provide interesting insight into the labor market and the wage 
setting practices of businesses.  The occupation and establishment information in the OES 
data explain most of the wage variation across individuals.  We find, not surprisingly, that 
detailed information on the individual’s occupation explains a sizable amount of wage 
variation.  Building on a small but growing literature, we also find substantial establishment 
wage differentials. 
 
Vb) Sensitivity Analysis 
  The R-squared of .8798 in Table 1 is unusually high if one were to compare it to most 
earnings regressions based on worker surveys.  We are not the first to find such a high R-
squared when employers are included: Groshen (1991b, page 869) finds that ￿occupation and 
establishment identity alone can explain over 90 percent of wage variation among blue-collar 
workers.￿  It is interesting to note that this high R-squared is achieved despite that fact that 
education and other individual determinants of wages are not available, confirming that 
occupation is a strong proxy for these factors.  This is supported by our finding that the 
residual individual component falls from .27 to .12 when we move from one-digit to five-digit 
occupation controls. 
                                                         
9  We recognize that it may be conceptually difficult to compare our results (which are computed from a national 
sample) with Groshen￿s results (which are computed from six industries).  One purpose of this simple 
comparison is to demonstrate that the results from our estimation, and in particular the high R-squareds, are 
similar to results from other data which use the same methodology.  
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  However, it is possible that despite the fact that the OES survey contains some of the 
most detailed and accurate occupational data available in any dataset, the R-squared may be 
inflated for technical reasons -- the wage intervals in which the data are reported may be ￿too 
wide￿ relative to the wage variation within establishments.  Clearly, as the occupational 
classifications become more detailed, or as the wage intervals become wider, the average 
number of wage intervals reported per job cell will decrease and the R-squareds will increase.  
In this section, we examine the possibility that this may be a source of bias by undertaking an 
extensive sensitivity analysis. 
  In our full sample, 62 percent of job cells contain all employment within one OES 
wage interval, whereas 16 percent of job cells contain employment in 3 or more OES wage 
intervals.
10  The average number of OES wage intervals for a job cell is 1.66.  Obviously 
these statistics will vary by establishment size.  For the largest establishments (those with 
more than 500 employees), 37 percent of job cells contain employment in only one OES wage 
interval, whereas 38 percent of job cells contain employment in 3 or more OES wage 
intervals.  We find it interesting that for these largest establishments, the R-squareds in the job 
cell regressions are still quite high at .8288 (see Appendix Table 1). 
  The technical appendix to this paper describes an econometric framework for 
analyzing how collecting wage data in intervals affects the R-squareds from our wage 
decomposition.  The essence of this framework is to simulate a distribution of individual 
wages which can then be collapsed to intervals corresponding to the OES wage intervals.  The 
following is a summary of our results.  If a continuous distribution of individual wages were 
used as the dependent variable in the regression of wages on occupation dummies, we 
calculate that the R-squared would be .5292 instead of the .5466 we report in Table 1.  
Similarly, the R-squared for the regression on establishment dummies should be .4798 instead 
of the .4955 reported in Table 1.  And our simulation suggests that after accounting for the 
effect of interval means, the R-squared for the main effect regression would fall from .7552 to 
.7312, and the R-squared for the job cell regression would fall from .8798 to .8518.  
Transforming these simulated R-squareds into the occupational and establishment 
contributions to wage variation, our estimates of {.2597, .2869, .2086, .1246, .1202} reported 
                                                         
10  See Appendix Table 1 for these statistics.  The unit of analysis in Appendix Table 1 is the job cell, which is a 
detailed 5-digit occupation within an establishment.  
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in Table 1 would change to {.2514, .2778, .2020, .1206, .1482}.  Each of the first four terms 
(the occupational effect, the joint effect, the establishment effect, and the job cell effect) falls 
slightly, and the residual individual effect rises from .1202 to .1482.  We conclude that 
collecting individual wage data as intervals in an establishment survey does not distort the 
conclusions we draw from our wage decomposition.
11  Indeed, this evidence supports the 
notion that an important source of earnings variation comes from between, rather than within, 
establishment variation. 
 
Vc) A Closer Examination of Establishment Wage Differentials 
  In column 2 of Table 1, we found that 20.9 percent of wage variation is attributable to 
differences across establishments.  This is strong evidence for establishment wage 
differentials.  However, these estimated EWDs might simply reflect cost of living differences 
across establishments in different geographical areas, or might be acting as a proxy for other 
characteristics such as size or industry.  We explore the importance of these effects by 
modifying Groshen￿s (1991b) decomposition to include establishment level explanatory 
variables such as age, size, industry, and county in the right hand side of the wage regression. 
  Our wage decomposition is now based on five regressions, where the additional 
regression is: 
 
  (Occ,X)       Wiej = µ + OCCjα  + Xeδ  + ε iej, 
 
The components of Xe are dummy variables for industry, county, age, and size.
12  The R-
squared from this fifth regression is notationally defined as R
2
Occ,X.  Since these explanatory 
variables are linear combinations of the establishment dummies, we can decompose the 
establishment contribution of the wage decomposition into two pieces: the explained and the 
                                                         
11  We present some additional evidence in support of this conclusion.  We took a cross-section of 
Unemployment Insurance wage records (described in Burgess, Lane, and Stevens, 2000) and regressed a 
continuous measure of annual earnings on firm dummies, and then ran a similar regression where the dependent 
variable has been recoded into point estimates corresponding to the OES hourly wage intervals.  The R-squareds 
are quite similar: .55 with the continuous measure, and .57 with the interval measure. 
12  We considered allowing age and size to be continuous variables rather than a vector of dummy variables, but 
we adopted our dummy variable approach for several reasons.  Intuitively, we maintain the spirit of "occupation 
first" followed by "establishment conditional on occupation" that is implicit in Groshen’s (1991b) wage 
decomposition.  Furthermore, the joint contribution is unaffected, which says that the sorting effect between 
occupations and establishments has not changed.  And finally, we note that Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(1999) recoded their continuous size variable into dummy variables.  
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  The wage decompositions controlling for the effects of observable establishment 
characteristics are presented in Table 2.  In column 1, we present the wage decomposition 
controlling for any county effects including cost of living differences that are common within 
counties.  These county controls account for one-fifth of the estimated establishment wage 
differentials (.0418/.2086), and thus local area differences explain some of why wages vary 
across establishments.  Similarly, in columns 2 through 5 of Table 2, we conclude that age, 
size, and industry can each only explain a small portion of why wages vary across 
establishments.
13  When we control for all observable effects together in column 6 of Table 2, 
we account for half of the estimated establishment wage differentials.  We conclude that 
establishment wage differentials can be only partially explained by observable establishment 
characteristics, and thus establishment wage differentials are an important explanation for 
why wages vary across individuals. 
 
Vd) Further Empirical Results 
  Many of the explanations put forward for the existence of employer effects on wages 
vary in importance for different industries.  For example, capital-labor complementarity 
should be more important in the goods producing industries than in the services providing 
industries, unionization rates vary dramatically across industries, and skill sorting should be 
more important in industries that produce heterogeneous output.  The results presented in 
Table 3a show noticeable differences across major industries.  Establishment wage 
differentials are most important in construction, mining, manufacturing, and TCPU, and are 
least important in public administration, FIRE, agriculture, and services.  EWDs explain 37 
percent of wage variation in construction, yet only 16 percent of wage variation in the 
                                                         
13  Since the largest size category of 500+ accounts for about 40 percent of the workers (but only 1.4 percent of 
the establishments), it is a worthwhile exercise to experiment with alternative size categories.  We find that the 
amount of the establishment effect that can be explained using observed establishment characteristics is not 
sensitive to the categorization of the size variable.  When we break out the 500+ category into deciles and use 18 
size class dummies (instead of the 9 used in Table 2), the size variable accounts for 11.7 percent of our estimated 
establishment effect (compared to 10.5 percent calculated from the statistics reported in Table 2).  
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services industry.  A number of reasons for these industry differences are possible: the 
traditional goods producing industries are more unionized than the other sectors (with the 
exception of public administration), and these industries may well have greater variation in 
capital usage. 
Interestingly, the construction and services industries are also quite different with 
regard to the contribution of occupational sorting: this component of the wage decomposition 
contributes little to variation in earnings in construction, but is quite important in services.  
This suggests that establishments in the construction industry bundle their workers in very 
similar ways, while establishments in the services industry bundle their workers very 
differently. 
  It is equally rewarding to analyze differences by establishment size.  As seen in Table 
3b, the importance of establishment wage differentials drops markedly and monotonically 
with the size of the establishment.  EWDs explain 30 percent of wage variation for 
establishments with 2-9 employees, yet explain 16.5 percent of wage variation for the largest 
establishments.  We also see that the percentage of the establishment effect that can be 
explained by observed characteristics rises with the size of the establishment.  Our finding 
that small establishments have more variation, both total and unexplained, in their 
contribution to wages is consistent with the notion that small establishments are more 




VI.  Occupational Wages Within Establishments 
 
  The empirical evidence from our wage decompositions highlights the importance of 
the establishment for understanding the variation of individual wages.  Even after controlling 
for observable characteristics that vary across establishments, we find substantial evidence of 
establishment wage differentials.  By definition, these establishment wage differentials 
measure the wage premium paid to all workers in the establishment, regardless of occupation.  
We now turn to examining the correlations of occupational wages within establishments.  Our 
                                                         
14  This conclusion mirrors the findings of Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (2006), who show that new 
businesses exhibit greater earnings heterogeneity than do mature businesses.  
 
17
analysis here is motivated by the team production model, well described by Kremer (1993).  
Simply put, in this model, workers of similar skill will match together in firms -- highly 
skilled supervisors will work with highly skilled production workers.  This reflects the 
complex nature of a multi-stage production process, which requires the coordinated and 
successful completion of distinct tasks.  In many production processes, it is not possible for 
several low skilled workers to substitute for one high skilled worker.  Empirically, this should 
result in a positive correlation of occupational wages within establishments. 
  Our analysis in this section is similar to previous work by Dickens and Katz (1987), 
Bronars and Famulari (1997), and Bronars, Bingley, Famulari, and Westergard-Nielsen 
(1999).  The goal of our correlation analysis is to examine the breadth of the establishment 
wage differentials across occupations.  For example, in a manufacturing plant, we would 
expect the wages of machinists and production supervisors to be positively correlated since 
they work side by side on the assembly line.  It is less likely, however, that wages of the 
accountants or the janitors in this manufacturing plant would be positively correlated with the 
wages of the machinists and the production supervisors. 
  An examination of the data reveals that while the correlations across closely related 
occupations are quite high, supporting a team production hypothesis, correlations are also 
surprisingly high across unrelated occupations.  In Figure 2, continuing with the example 
from the previous paragraph, we graph the average wages of one occupation against the 
average wages of another occupation in the same establishment.
15  We find, not surprisingly, 
that the wages of machinists and the wages of production supervisors are closely correlated 
(the correlation is .61).
16  We also find that the wages of accountants are positively correlated 
with the wages of machinists and production supervisors (the correlations are .43 and .41), 
and the wages of janitors are positively correlated with the wages of machinists and 
production supervisors (the correlations are .61 and .55).  Perhaps most surprisingly, the 
wages of accountants are highly correlated with the wages of janitors in the same 
establishment (the correlation is .41). 
                                                         
15  There are 47,633 manufacturing establishments with at least one worker in any of the four occupations.  We 
have selected the 338 manufacturing establishments with at least 2 workers in each of the four occupations. 
16  The correlation coefficient is the square root of the R-squared from an OLS regression of one occupational 
mean wage against another occupational mean wage.  For example, the R-squared from a regression of the mean 
wages of machinists against the mean wages of production supervisors is .37 (=.61*.61).  
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  Consistent with our earlier analysis of establishment wage differentials, the enormous 
wage heterogeneity across the manufacturing establishments that is evident in Figure 2 
deserves mention.  For example, the establishment mean ln(wage) of accountants in this 
sample ranges from 2.1 to 3.9 (with a mean of 2.94 and a standard deviation of 0.26).  This 
heterogeneity is consistent with the findings of Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (2006), who 
outline a model where some unobserved business "type" generates heterogeneity in 
establishment productivity and wages.  Furthermore, our findings in Figure 2 of skill 
complementarity across occupations within the establishment fits quite nicely with 
Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer’s model of complementarity between the "type" of business 
and the skill composition of its workforce. 
  We investigate the relationship of occupational mean wages within establishments 
more formally in Table 4.  For the seven major occupations, we present the correlation matrix 
of occupational mean wages within establishments.  We present two correlations for each 
occupational pair.  The top correlation is unadjusted for observable establishment 
characteristics, whereas the bottom correlation is based on individual wage data with county, 
age, size, and major industry means removed. 
  Looking at the data unadjusted for establishment characteristics, the average of the 21 
off-diagonal correlations is .4614.  This is very similar to the estimate of Bronars and 
Famulari (1997), who report a correlation of mean occupational wages between professional 
and nonprofessionals of .499.  All these correlations in Table 4 are positive and statistically 
greater than zero at conventional levels of significance.  This says that establishments that pay 
well for one occupation also pay well for all other occupations.  One particularly interesting 
pattern is that all correlations below .4 are in the upper right corner of the table -- it would 
seem that the least skill matching within establishments occurs between traditional white 
collar occupations (managers, professionals, and sales) and blue collar occupations (services, 
agricultural, and production).  The correlations in Table 4 are consistent with theories which 
predict that workers are sorted into establishments based on skill. 
  Just as with the wage decomposition analysis, it is possible that these correlations are 
biased upward by not controlling for observable characteristics of the establishment.  After 
taking out the effects of county, age, size, and industry, it is clear that the correlations fall.  
The average off-diagonal correlation has fallen dramatically from .4614 to .2700.  However,  
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the correlations remain quite large, and all the correlations remain statistically greater than 
zero.  This leads us to conclude that the unadjusted occupational mean correlations within 
establishments do measure cost of living differences, industry effects, or size effects to a large 
extent, but are also measuring establishment specific pay practices that are unobservable to 
the econometrician. 
 
VII.  Conclusions and Discussion 
 
  Using the wage decomposition proposed by Groshen (1991b), we have documented 
the magnitude of occupation and establishment wage differentials, the sorting of high wage 
occupations into high wage establishments, and the extent of employer specific wage 
structures -- the wage premium paid to particular occupations in particular establishments 
above or below the wage premium predicted by the occupational and the establishment 
differentials.  Our key finding in this paper is the large effect that the establishment has on the 
wages of the individuals who work there.  We find that controlling for detailed occupation, 21 
percent of wage variation can be explained by merely knowing the individual’s establishment.  
Accounting for observable characteristics of the employer reduces these establishment wage 
differentials by half.  Taking our empirical analysis one step further, we have shown that the 
establishment’s wage premium is correlated across major occupation groups within the 
establishment.  These empirical estimates complement and enhance previous work on the 
topic of employer effects on wages. 
  One of the dominant themes running through the literature of employer effects on 
wages is that establishments systematically sort workers by skill.  The existing empirical work 
finds that this sorting explains much but not all of the observed employer effects on wages.  
Our findings are certainly consistent with this conclusion.  In our wage decomposition, merely 
knowing the worker’s establishment explains 50 percent of the observed wage variation across 
individuals.  Controlling for the seven one-digit occupation indicators lowers this wage 
variation explained by establishments to 36 percent, and controlling for five-digit occupation 
indicators lowers this further to 21 percent.  Since our detailed occupational information 
proxies for the worker￿s skills, we also find that controlling for skill explains much, but 
certainly not all, of the estimated establishment wage differentials in the raw data.  
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  Another of the themes running through the literature is that establishment wage 
differentials merely proxy, at least in part, for unobserved characteristics of the establishment 
that are correlated with wages.  Our results are consistent with this hypothesis.  To the extent 
that differences across establishments in working conditions, cost of living, rent sharing, and 
capital-labor ratios can be proxied for by observable establishment characteristics such as 
county, age, size, and industry, we find that controlling for these characteristics lowers the 
estimated establishment wage differentials from 21 percent of wage variation to 10 percent. 
  We are now left with the question of how to explain our estimated establishment wage 
differentials.  Any explanation we propose must simultaneously account for our finding that 
the establishment wage differentials are common to workers in all occupations in the 
establishment. 
  One possible explanation is that the observed differentials simply reflect differences in 
unobserved labor quality across establishments, and that more detailed information on 
individual ability and human capital would serve to eliminate the EWDs.  To the extent that 
this explanation is true, EWDs support the sorting theory, to the extent that it is not, EWDs 
support variations in establishment pay practices.  Testing this hypothesis is beyond the 
capabilities of our dataset, since we don￿t have information on worker characteristics such as 
education, age, tenure, or training.  However, there are several reasons to doubt that this 
hypothesis is the sole explanation of the estimated EWDs.  First, the work of Groshen (1991b) 
and Levine (1992) suggests (but does not prove) that occupation adequately controls for 
standard measures of human capital.  In addition, work by O’Shaughnessy, Levine, and 
Cappelli (2000) finds that measures of skill and job characteristics do not explain much of the 
difference in wages across employers (although these measures of skill explain quite a bit of 
wage variation across individuals).  The findings of John Abowd and his colleagues, who 
have access to longitudinal linked employer-employee microdata and are thus able to proxy 
for unobserved skill using person-specific dummy variables, suggest that unmeasured 
heterogeneity across individuals explains some but not all of the estimated employer effects 
on wages.  And finally, it is difficult to theorize how unobserved ability and human capital 
could be important contributors to wage differentials across all occupations in the 
establishment -- such as janitors and accountants.  
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  Another possibility is that the observed differentials reflect differences in technology 
or capital across establishments.  Pekkarinen (2002) presents an interesting model and 
analysis along these lines.  Recent work using establishment microdata has illustrated the 
striking amount of heterogeneity across establishments within narrowly defined aggregates -- 
see, for example, Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (2006).  While we have used establishment 
characteristics such as age, size, and industry to proxy for such differences, it would be useful 
to incorporate establishment level information on inputs to (and outputs from) the production 
process into our analysis.  However interesting and worthwhile this line of research would be, 
we believe it is unlikely that capital intensity or technology per se would produce 
establishment wage differentials that are common to all occupations -- again, the example of 
janitors and accountants comes to mind. 
  We believe that any explanation for the existence of establishment wage differentials 
will rest on a combination of theories.  Empirical work from recent analysis of matched 
employer-employee data shows that higher skilled workers not only work together in the same 
establishment, but also tend to work with higher quality capital and technology -- see Doms, 
Dunne, and Troske (1997) and Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (2006).  Modeling these basic 
human capital results, augmented with a theory of why human resource pay policies might 
differ across establishments, should show how the gains from skill sorting and capital-labor 
complementarities can be spread to workers in all occupations in the establishment.  These 
thoughts are not original to us, but run through the existing literature examining why the 
wages of individuals are affected by their employer.  There is much more to be learned from 
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Technical Appendix:  OES Wages and Interval Econometrics 
 
 
The OES survey collects employee wage data in intervals.  As is evident from Figure 1, this 
eliminates any wage heterogeneity across individuals within an interval.  However, because 
there are multiple wage intervals for a given occupation on the OES survey form, there is still 
wage heterogeneity across individuals within job cells (where job cells are defined as an 
occupation within an establishment).  In our decomposition, where we partition the total sum 
of squares into its components, this interval method of collecting individual wage data should 
reduce the residual variance attributable to individuals and thus increase the explained 
variance due to establishments and occupations.  How severe might this problem be?  In this 
appendix, we present an econometric framework for simulating how this data collection 
methodology affects the estimates from our wage decomposition. 
 
Assume that an individual’s true ln(wage) is Yiej, but the data analyst observes Wiej -- the 
natural logarithm of the OES interval mean.  The relationship between the observed wage and 
the true wage is Wiej=Yiej+ω iej, where ω iej measures how the individual’s wage differs from the 
interval mean.  For example, in Figure 1, wage interval "H" includes all employees earning 
between $19.25 and $24.24 per hour, and the OES interval mean for survey year 1997 is 
Wiej=21.43.  With appropriate transformations to logarithms, ω iej in this example is bounded 
between -.1073 and .1232.  We shall refer to ω iej as the "interval error." 
 
For any vector of explanatory variables X, the R-squared that we estimate from the regression 
Wiej=Xiejβ
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But the "true" unobserved individual wage (Yiej) should have been used as the dependent 
variable in the regression, rather than the observed interval mean (Wiej).  The R-squared that 
would have been estimated from the regression Yiej=Xiejβ
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If we assume that X’ω =0, so that  W Y β β ￿ ￿ = ,
17 then 
                                                         
17  If X is a matrix of establishment indicators, a sufficient condition for X’ω =0 is that the mean of the interval 
error is zero for every establishment.  While one can come up with examples of certain establishments where this 
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Because the point estimates for the interval wages are computed as the mean of the underlying 
wage distribution for each interval using data from the Employment Cost Index, we know that 
ϖ =0 for each interval.
18  Since W is a fixed value within each interval, it is straightforward to 
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Given our assumptions, one can show that  2 2
W Y R R < .  Therefore, when using interval means 
rather than the true unobserved wages, the R-squareds that we obtain from our regressions 
overstate the contribution of occupation and establishment indicators to wage variation, and 
thus understate the residual contribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
 
We now describe our simulation exercise that is based on this econometric framework.  We 
have simulated a ln(wage) for 34,453,430 individuals from a normal distribution with mean 
2.5133 and standard deviation 0.5446 (this mean and standard deviation are reported in the 
footnotes to Table 1).  We then compute the corresponding wage level, define the interval 
wage corresponding to the OES intervals reported in Figure 1, and also define the interval 
error ω iej as the difference between the individual’s true wage and the natural logarithm of the 
interval wage.  After forcing the interval error ω iej to be mean zero within intervals, we 
calculate all the terms necessary to compare  2
Y R  and  2
W R  as defined in the formulas above. 
 
We report in Table 1 that the R-squared for the regression of wages on occupation dummies is 
.5466.  If the individual wages instead of interval means were used as the dependent variable 
in the regression, we calculate that this R-squared should be .5292.
19  Similarly, the R-squared 
for the regression on establishment dummies should be .4798 instead of the .4955 reported in 
Table 1.  And our simulation suggests that after accounting for the effect of interval means, 
the R-squared for the main effect regression would fall from .7552 to .7312, and the R-
squared for the job cell regression would fall from .8798 to .8518. 
 
Transforming these simulated R-squareds into the occupational and establishment 
contributions to wage variation, our estimates of {.2597, .2869, .2086, .1246, .1202} reported 
in Table 1 would change to {.2514, .2778, .2020, .1206, .1482}.  Each of the first four terms 
(the occupational effect, the joint effect, the establishment effect, and the job cell effect) falls 
                                                         
18  This statement is not true for the uppermost interval, where the OES interval mean is set in nominal terms at 
$60.01.  In our econometric framework, we censor the simulated wage distribution at this value and thus by 
definition impose a zero mean for this interval. 
19  The original R-squared of .5466 is calculated as [1-(4,633,689/10,219,022)].  The simulated R-squared of 
.5234 is calculated as [1-(4,633,689+335,893)/(10,219,022+335,893)], where ω ’ω =335,893.  
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slightly, and the residual individual effect rises from .1202 to .1482.  We conclude that having 
individual wage data calculated as interval means does not distort the conclusions we draw 
from our wage decomposition. 
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